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LEAD

ARTICLE

Health Care Reform
A free-market proposal
An award-winning essay proposes applying
free-market economics to health care in order
to maximize consumer welfare.
by Andrew Ferris and Griffin Seiler
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are a result of government intervention. This government
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that the case for government intervention is strong; however, this strength is only theoretical. This is because, in
theory, governments are wise, disinterested, and technically competent. However, in practice, governments rarely
measure up to such standards. Thus, as empirically proven
in the health care market, government failure has done
more harm than the failure of the market.' Accordingly,
minimal governmental intervention, rather than socialism, is the preferred method to correct market failure.
This article proposes a free-market health care reform
solution aimed towards reducing demand for high cost
primary health care services, increasing supply in the
health care market, and lowering market transaction costs.
This type of market-based reform will maximize welfare
by vesting health care choice and responsibility in the
consumer. Fundamental health care reform should include
the following components: universal coverage of basic
health care;7 individual internalization of the costs of
health care services received; limited government intervention in the market; and the maintenance of existing
antitrust law. This proposal achieves these goals by mandating a minimum level of catastrophic health care insurance' and use of the Medical Savings Account ("MSA"). 9
All individuals employed in the United States would be
required to purchase high deductible catastrophic health
insurance for themselves and their families. In addition,
all individuals would be required to pay a minimum annual amount into a MSA. 10 This MSA would provide funds
for health maintenance expenses, cover insurance deductible amounts, and serve as a funding reserve for future
health expenses. The MSA and insurance would be selffunded with pre-tax dollars. In conjunction with these
reforms, the federal government's role as a primary provider and third party payor of medical care would be
phased out. All federal employees and entitlement recipients would receive a transfer credit to purchase the health
insurance plan of their choice and to establish an MSA."
These transfer credits would be in the form of a negative
income tax. 2
This plan proposes three specific reforms aimed toward correcting failure in the health care market. First,
the supply of health care must be increased. This should
be achieved by federal regulation of medical licensing
with the goal of increasing the number of non-physician
practitioners and the scope of services they provide. Additionally, medical school and residency program enrollment restrictions must be reduced. Second, malpractice
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costs must be curtailed. This proposal addresses the malpractice costs problem by eliminating pain and suffering
and non-economic loss of consortium damages in ordinary negligence malpractice actions and by establishing
interdisciplinary medical malpractice review boards to
eliminate frivolous claims. 3 Third, more restrictions must
be placed on insurance carriers. Under this proposal, insurance carriers would be required to make uniform and
comprehensive disclosures about the type and extent of
coverage their policies provide. These reforms will increase the quality and availability of health care, personal
accountability, and choice, while reducing government
regulation and health care expenditures.
Health care reform has become a politically divisive
issue not because of any special opposition to reform, but
rather, because special interest lobbyists and elected officials have engaged in a pork barrel feeding frenzy whenever large scale government projects are proposed."
Health care debate should concentrate on the primary issues of funding, coverage, choice, and control with the
interests of the average American being the sole concern.
Instead, the public has been besieged by a multitude of
views on the problems in the health care market. Politicians, providers, insurers, and special interest groups have
embraced false problems and put forth unworkable selfserving proposals. Until very recently, the health care
debate has focused primarily on special interest politics
rather than economic analysis and logical problem solving. This health care reform proposal attempts to cut
through the politics of the health care reform debate and
addresses the deficiencies inherent in the health care market in an attempt to formulate market-based solutions.
Part I.A. of this paper discusses the competitive market model of health care services that existed historically
in the pre-1900 health care market. Part I.B. demonstrates
how the health care market evolved from a paradigm of
efficiency to a market characterized by major defects.
Next, the paper analyzes additional market defects in Part
I.C. Thereafter, in Part I.D., the paper analyzes previous
government attempts at health care reform. In Part II the
paper considers the antitrust constraints on market-based
health care reform. Then, in Part m, the paper argues that
the Clinton plan fails to correct the inherent problems in
the health care market. In Part IV, the paper presents a
detailed free market health care solution to correct the
identified problems in the health care market. Finally, Part
V of the paper briefly discusses funding.
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Health care market analysis
A competitive market paradigm. The following section illustrates that prior to large scale government intervention, the health care market was competitive and efficient. This analysis is a starting point for understanding
that government intervention in the health care market is
the cause of the problem, not the solution. A perfectly
competitive market operates to ensure low prices and high
quality, and therefore, maximizes consumer welfare. The
modem health care market, however, deviates significantly
from the perfectly competitive market.'5 Perfect competition, a basic principle of economics under which all humans will act rationally to maximize utility, tends to drive
the market towards a welfare-maximizing result. This
occurs because rational consumers in a free market will
purchase goods and services consistent with their preferences and ability to pay. While most product and service
markets deviate from a perfectly competitive market, the
pre-1900 health care market came close to the competitive ideal.
Prior to 1900, the American health care market was a
model of efficiency. 6 Consumers and providers participated equally in a competitive market. Low demand, high
supply, and negligible transaction costs kept health care
costs low. The cost of health care services was driven by
market forces, free from government participation.
Before 1900, demand for health care services was a
product of individual preference and ability to pay. 7
Equally significant, lifestyle played an important role in
defining medical care needs. 8 A low- risk lifestyle contributed to lower health costs. Furthermore, individuals
and society internalized the cost of high risk behavior and
accepted non-treatment as a legitimate health care choice.
Finally, fewer high-cost services were available.
From a supply perspective, primary care substitutes
were readily available prior to 1900. 9 Both physicians
and non-physicians provided primary medical care. Midwives and other alternative practitioners provided competent low cost medical care in both urban and rural areas. In addition, self-treatment was prevalent.
Further, transaction costs were much lower before the
turn of the century. The federal government was not involved in the health care market, either as a regulator or
as a participant. Malpractice actions were extremely rare,m
and administrative costs and overhead were minimal.
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Successful health care reform must emulate the virtues of the pre-1900 free market health care paradigm.
Specifically, government involvement must be minimized.
Additionally, successful market reform must include these
key elements: individual financial accountability; individual choice; limited government involvement; available
substitutes for medical care providers; and limited malpractice actions.
Historical development of market defects. As the
health care market evolved and government intervention
increased, the market was transformed from an efficient
to a defective market. It is critical to understand that the
problems in the health care market developed over time.
The first factor in this transformation was the centralization of health care facilities. Centralization, combined with
demand uncertainty, caused increased overhead. This, in
turn, led to the development of health insurance plans,
which over time restricted the supply of providers, increased demand for services, and added transaction costs.
In addition, wage and price controls during World War II,
as well as tax policy, combined to tie health insurance to
employment.' As a result, competitive market forces were
displaced and overall health care costs rose.
The proliferation of hospitals. The genesis of defects
in the health care market occurred when the first hospitals were constructed. Around the start of the twentieth
century, hospitals became the primary component of the
health care delivery system. Hospitals were able to care
for a large number of patients in a centralized location,
resulting in the more efficient utilization of physicians,
nurses and support personnel. Moreover, hospitals created a market for new technology. The benefits of hospital-based medical care resulted in a stunning proliferation of hospitals.22 Further, as the public embraced the
convenience and benefits of centralized medical care,
demand for health care services increased.3 Consequently,
increased demand caused financing problems for hospitals.2' Because consumer demand for health care services
is inherently uncertain," hospitals were forced to increase
capacity to meet demand fluctuations. Naturally this resulted in an increase in overhead costs. At times when
capacity exceeded demand, hospitals had difficulty paying their fixed costs.26
The development of health insurance.To finance these
overhead costs, hospital administrators sought to price
services by prorating overhead costs over the entire popu-
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lation of hospital users. This proration led to the use of
insurance to allocate cost on the basis of risk. Insurance
allowed hospitals to cover increasing overhead costs in
the face of uncertain demand. 7 Early insurance plans laid
the foundation for the financial and organizational structure central to current health care financing problems.
Under a typical plan, a subscriber paid a premium which
would cover the expected cost of hospital care of a certain duration.2 For hospitals, this provided the important
benefit of being able to pool risks, thereby reducing the
costs associated with demand uncertainty in the health
care market.
As the number and size of these plans increased, state
governments attempted to bring hospitals under the regulatory reach of insurance commissions. 9 The American
Hospital Association ("AHA") responded to state governmental pressure by establishing non-profit groups to offer health plans.3" However, AHA and other medical groups
persuaded states to exempt these plans from state insurance, tax, and antitrust regulation
through lobbying efforts. 1 As a
result, "Blue Cross" plans were
born.32 State authorization and
hospital cooperation assured that
only one "Blue Cross" organization operated in a given area.33
The benefit and reimbursement structure established by the
Blue Cross organizations
("Blues") provided anti-competitive incentives for health
care providers and divorced consumers from the true cost
of health care services. These two effects are central to
the problems inherent in the modern health care market.
Specifically, physicians were paid on the basis of "reasonable and customary" fees in their area. This, in effect,
mandated cartel pricing?' Physicians could charge higher
prices if they all agreed. They had no incentive to prescribe less expensive treatments.
Hospitals were reimbursed a percentage of their costs
based on the number of plan subscribers using hospital
facilities and the amount of capital expenditures made by
the hospital.35 Hospital administrators then used this reimbursement scheme to capitalize the cost of new hospitals. Like physicians, hospitals had no incentive to control costs. Because of asymmetric information, the market did not prevent the development of these reimbursement schemes or police abuses in their implementation.

The Blues developed the third-party payment system.
Patients received treatment and the insurance plans directly reimbursed providers . As a result, patients were
divorced from actual treatm ent cost and with no incentive to reduce consumption. Market failure was amplified
as early market domination by the Blues forced other insurance plans to adopt the sa me inherently defective benefit and reimbursement struc:ture.
Health care as an emplo yment benefit. The development of the tie between heal th care and employment further separated the consumer from actual health care costs.
In addition, this tie provided a political incentive for govemient intervention in the nnarket. During the 1940s and
1950s, health insurance gain ed prominence as an employment benefit. Because of the labor shortage during World
War II, the federal governr lent implemented wage and
price controls.36 This forced employers to use benefits to
compete for the best labor and to attract new entrants to
the labor market.37 After the war ended and federal wage
controls were lifted, labor
unions continued to successfully demand health
insurance in contract negotiations.38 This tie between employment and
health insurance was further strengthened when
the Internal Revenue Service ruled that health insurance costs were deductib le to employers and not taxable to employees. 9
As health insurance bec ame closely tied to the employment relationship, the w orker-recipient of health care
services became divorced from direct payment for the
services received.' Health c are took on the characteristics of an entitlement withouit direct personal cost. Natural market demand restrictio ns were severely diminished.
The health care recipient had no incentive to reduce usage or seek lower cost treatm ent.4'1 Finally, employer-provided health care granted li ttle incentive for the worker
to self-diagnose and treat minor ailments.
Social welfare programs Health insurance financed
through employment benefit packages left many people
without coverage. Conseque ntly, political forces induced
the federal government to eestablish social welfare programs to cover these groups. "As a result, the federal govemient became both a prov'ider and a third-party payor

Patients were divorced
from actual costs and left
with no incentive to
reduce consumption.
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of health care. The programs creating Medicaid43 and
Medicare' were enacted in 1965. These programs expanded federal and state government intervention in the
health care market. As a third-party payor, the government adopted the defective reimbursement financing structure already established by the Blues and commercial
health insurers. 5 Hospitals were reimbursed according to
their costs, while physicians were permitted to charge their
"reasonable and customary" fees.' This system intensified the market disincentives on the supply side.47
From the demand side, the effect on the market was
even more profound. Social welfare programs, like insurance plans, served to completely divorce the consumer
from the cost of receiving health care.48 Medicaid recipients received health care services at no charge to themselves. Medicare recipients paid small premiums which
had no relation to use of services. Thus, government intervention meant that for a significant portion of the health
care market, demand and supply were no longer price
determinants. As a direct result, government expenditures
on these entitlement programs exploded. 9

quality care. ' State regulations mandate that only licensed
physicians provide primary health care services.5 To earn
a medical license, a person must attend an accredited medical school and complete postgraduate training in a hospital residency program. Medical school admissions, as well
as acceptance into residency programs, are also controlled
by physician groups. As a result, non-physician substitutes for health care providers and the total number of
physicians are artificially reduced.
High transaction costs characterize the health care
market. Compliance with state and federal government
regulation is one primary cost. The behavior of every participant in the health care market is regulated. Examples
include certificate of need laws, insurance regulations,
Medicare and Medicaid payment and reimbursement regulations, licensing regulations, restrictions on the purchase
of pharmaceuticals, and antitrust laws. Also, providers are
subject to transaction costs resulting from medical malpractice liability. Further, an asymmetry of information
related to the purchase of health insurance increases overall consumer costs.

Additional market defects. As the preceding section
illustrated, the proliferation of hospitals, the rise of insurance financing, the tie between health care and employment, and social welfare programs all combined to displace the natural role of supply and demand in the health
care market. Over time, the failed market of today developed and additional factors further magnified the problems inherent in the structure of the health care market.
Uninsuredfree riders.While many Americans receive
health insurance through their employer or through state
or federal governments, there is a large number of individuals uninsured or underinsured. 0 This later group is
largely composed of individuals who are unemployed,
employed part-time, self-employed or uninsurable by reason of a pre-existing medical condition. Often, these individuals are either destitute and cannot afford to purchase health insurance or choose not to purchase health
insurance with their available resources. These "free riders"51 receive health care; however, in most instances they
never pay the total cost of the services received. 2 As a
result, the insured population53 finds itself paying higher
overall costs to finance the free riders' benefits.
Supply restrictions. The American Medical Association, the physicians' lobbying organization, and its state
counterparts artificially restrict the supply of primary
health care providers under the auspices of maintaining

Government attempts at reform. Faced with increasing health care costs caused by the defective market structure just illustrated, Congress and state governments have
repeatedly attempted to reform the health care market.
However, these reform efforts have failed to address the
defects inherent in the health care market. Instead, the
focus of this legislation has been ill-conceived industry
regulation driven by a blind desire to satisfy special interest constituencies. This kind of government regulation
only serves to magnify the structural problems inherent
in the health care market.
To illustrate, legislative enactments in the 1970s provided strong incentives for states to establish Certificate
of Need ("CON") programs. 6 The regulatory philosophy
behind CON legislation is that an excess of beds or equipment generates a self-fulfilling demand, and that the most
effective way of controlling this demand is to carefully
control or reduce supply. 7 It was not a surprise to economists when CON regulations proved to be a poor substitute for free-market operation. 8 Despite the fact that Congress repealed the legislation in 1986, the vast majority
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of states still maintain CON programs. 9 A CON license es-

sentially grants a geographic monopoly to the holder. After
receiving a CON license, a provider may charge monopolistic prices. As a result, providers are induced to spend
significant resources to obtain CONs and to prevent their
Lead Articles e 49

competitors from obtaining CONS. The result is an overall
increase in prices and market transaction costs.
In the period between 1973 and 1988 state governments passed laws mandating that health insurance plans
pay for specific medical services, including psychiatric
and chiropractic care.6' These coverage mandates were
the result of aggressive lobbying from health care providers and consumer advocates. Coverage mandates guarantee markets for favored health care providers. As a result, the supply of providers offering the service increases,
policyholders increase their use of the service, and the
cost of the service rises. The effect of mandated coverage
laws is increased health insurance costs discouraging the
purchase of health insurance.6'
In 1988, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") under which the federal
government assumed responsibility for regulating employer-provided welfare
plans, including health
care. 62ERISA encouraged
employers to avoid state
insurance regulations,
including coverage requirements, by self-insuring.63 However, only
large employers have the
cash flow to establish
self-insurance programs. Further, because ERISA is a complex statute with significant penalties for noncompliance,
it has had the result of increasing transaction costs for
those employers who establish plans subject to its restrictions.
The 1983 Social Security Act was another congressional effort at health care cost control. This legislation
established the prospective payment system ("Pps") for
hospital reimbursement by Medicare. Under PPS, Medi6
care established a fixed ceiling for hospital service costs.
If a hospital's actual cost for a treatment is less than the
fixed fee, the hospital keeps the difference. If the hospital's actual cost is more, the hospital suffers the loss.
The objective of the program was to encourage competition among hospitals and create the incentive to reduce
costs. PPS has not achieved the desired results. Like all
price control systems, PPS creates skewed incentives for
providers. Specifically, providers shift costs to services
not covered by price controls,' "dump" high cost patients,
and reduce the overall quality of care.

Antitrust restraints on health care reform
A free market health reform proposal must operate
within the constraints of current antitrust law. Defects in
the health care market have resulted in the formation of
cartels by both health care providers and purchasers. Physician cartelization efforts fall into two general categories: price fixing and group boycotts. Hospital cartelization
efforts typically involve mergers and acquisitions. Cartels foster economic efficiencies and encourage competition; however, they also operate to extract monopoly prices
and eliminate market entry. Due to the potential for health
care cartels to harm consumer welfare, many cartels have
been challenged under antitrust law.
For many years, health care providers avoided antitrust enforcement by utilizing a number of defenses and
immunities. However, beginning in 1975, the Supreme
- Court rejected these defenses one by one.'
All doubt regarding the existence of antitrust immunity for the health care industry was removed in Arizona v. Maricopa
County MedicalSociety. 7 Since then, various provider cartelization efforts have been
challenged under antitrust statutes. Some
of these efforts have been overt attempts
Ire.
at price fixing. For example, in Maricopa,
the Supreme Court held that by attempting to establish a minimum fee schedule for insurance
payments, a physician joint venture committed a per se
violation of the Sherman Act." Other similar physician
efforts to fix prices have been declared illegal.'
Physicians have also engaged in group boycotts. In
Michigan State Medical Society, joint provider efforts to
boycott government programs in order to obtain higher
fees were struck down.7' Additionally, efforts by provider
groups to prevent the establishment of managed care
groups have been found illegal.7' Physicians have also
utilized group boycotts against other physicians in their
attempts to increase market share.72 Other group boycott
efforts have been more subtle. For example, in United
States v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center," the Federal
Trade Commission ("Frc") successfully challenged actions by hospitals and physicians to prevent HMO-employed physicians from utilizing hospitals.' Attempts to
prevent non-physician care providers from obtaining hospital staff privileges have also been successfully challenged by the FrC."

Socialized medi cine,
like all other so(:ialist
systems, will re duce
consumer welfa
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Hospitals have formed cartels by merging to reduce
overall market capacity and take advantage of economies
of scale. In many cases, the FTC has successfully challenged these acquisitions under Section VII of the Clayton
76
Act and Section V of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
These hospital merger cases turn on the issues of product
and geographic market definition. Furthermore, joint ventures between hospitals and physicians are an increasingly
popular provider effort at cartelization that is attracting
antitrust scrutiny."
On the demand side of the health care market, the insurance industry operates as a government sanctioned
cartel." Under federal law, those engaged in "the business of insurance" are granted broad antitrust immunity.7 9
From an economic standpoint, this policy is a government sanction of the "theory of the second best."' 0
Despite antitrust immunity, insurers who exercise their
significant market power have been subject to antitrust
challenges. Providers, consumers, and even other insurers have challenged insurer contracts with providers.
These challenges, however, have not succeeded as courts
have recognized the pro-competitive benefits to exclusive dealings.8 ' Cartels have emerged on both the supply
and demand side of the health care market. The existence
of these cartels is positive for consumers in that competition and economies of scale are facilitated. However, antitrust laws must be prudently enforced to prevent these
cartels from eliminating competition.

A non-market solution is no solution
Socialized medicine, like all other socialist systems,
will reduce consumer welfare, reduce personal autonomy,
and result in a redistribution of wealth based on the value
judgments of those in power. Specifically, governmental
decision-making divorced of market considerations will
result in wage and price controls, rationing of services,
excessive administration costs, and oppressive government-dictated value judgments.
The Clinton proposal states basic universal health care
as a primary goal. However, universal coverage under this
plan would also increase the power and influence of the
federal government. In order to increase coverage, reduce
costs, and eliminate the free-rider problem, the Clinton
plan proposes: (1) large purchasing alliances; (2) provider
networks; (3) community rated risk pools; and (4) reducing the number of specialist physicians. These proposals,
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like previous government intervention efforts, fail to address the fundamental defects inherent in the health care
market. Additionally, these proposals will reduce competitive market forces. Furthermore, if current antitrust
laws are not enforced, consumer welfare will be reduced.
Purchasingalliances.The first element of the Clinton
proposal is the creation of state or regional-based purchasing alliances operated by either state governmental
agencies or non-profit corporations. These purchasing
alliances would establish various health plans, set fee
schedules, negotiate insurance premiums, and contract
with providers on behalf of their members." In essence,
these alliances would force all consumers into one or two
large health plans with a National Health Board to oversee them. These large scale alliances really amount to large
government run and subsidized Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans. 3 The idea of alliances creating economies
of scale is palatable if they were not government operated. However, cost savings from alliances would more
likely occur from government dictated rationing of services,' reduced coverage, and reduced quality of care
rather than from administrative and market efficiencies.
With government run alliances, providers of health care
would not have to convince thousands of consumers about
the value of their services. Providers would buy market
share by negotiating with government bureaucrats.
The principal benefit of these alliances is cost containment by virtue of purchasing power. However, it is precisely this purchasing power that creates the potential for
antitrust problems. Large alliances could potentially possess sufficient market power to dictate prices. As such,
the alliances would be subject to a challenge as an illegal
joint purchasing arrangement.85 Admittedly, cooperative
purchasing arrangements typically have pro-competitive
effects; however, the potential for anti-competitive behavior exists. First, an alliance could drive prices below
marginal cost through the exercise of monopsony power.
Second, consumer alliance members could be charged
monopoly prices. In either circumstance, the market, and
consequently, the consumer, are harmed.
Provider networks. The Clinton proposal also relies
on large networks of physicians, hospitals, and third-party
payers who would contract with the alliances to provide
medical services to members. 6 In reality, this system is
nothing more than government legislation of the "theory
of the second best." Rather than solving the market de-
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fects that led to the creation of one monopoly,' the Clinton
plan would allow the creation of other non-competitive
monopolies or cartels to deal with the first. These provider networks would have an incentive to fix prices and
reduce services in order to maximize profits.
Community rated risk pools. In addition to the creation of purchasing alliances and provider networks, the
Clinton plan limits the ability of insurance companies to
segment the health care market based on risk. This plan
will result in healthy consumers subsidizing the health
care costs of people making unhealthy lifestyle choices.
As a result, the incentive to live a healthy lifestyle and
use preventative health care will be eliminated. Short of
government lifestyle mandates, community rated risk
pools can only result in increased health care expenditures.88 Under such a plan, low-risk individuals would be
paying a higher rate than otherwise, while high-risk individuals would pay a lower rate. Thus, the low-risk lifestyle
is being taxed to subsidize the high-risk lifestyle. 9
Instead of community rated risk pools, health insurance should be based on actuarially fair rates determined
by a competitive market. Competition on cost, including
risk, is the essence of capitalism. When free market assumptions are valid, the market clearing price yields a
match of consumer demand with consumer desire that
maximizes consumer welfare. As such, competition on
risk is both just and good for society. Furthermore, prevention of risk competition would run afoul of current
antitrust laws.'
Reducing the number of specialists.The Clinton plan
calls for a reduction in the number of physician specialists. Clinton incorrectly faults specialists for high costs
based on a belief that specialists charge more than generalists. While Clinton is correct that specialists cost more
than generalists, this analysis of the problem is overly
simplistic and the proposed solution ignores free market
principles.9'
Specialists are merely following the law of supply and
demand. Specialists can charge more because they provide a special service for which people are willing to pay
more. Any governmental regulation in the market will
displace competitive forces. Any attempt to regulate lower
wages for specialists would decrease the number and quality of specialists available. Reducing the number of specialists would only result in an increase in the value of
their services, which in a competitive market, go to the
highest bidder.
52 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Furthermore, a limited supply of medical specialists
has the potential to result in a concentrated market, and
thus implicates antitrust concerns. Government agencies
would dictate the type and number of specialists, thereby
granting specialists monopolies. Absent price controls,
specialists will be given the incentive to charge monopolistic prices.
Taken together, Clinton's reform proposals fail to address the defects inherent in the health care market. His
plan will result in increased concentration in almost every area of the health care market. Absent effective antitrust enforcement, consumer welfare will suffer.

A free-market reform solution
Historical analysis of the health care market shows the
defects inherent in the current health care market. Natural market mechanisms do not operate to control supply
and demand and the market suffers from high transaction
costs. A solution to these problems must correct these
fundamental market defects. Our solution encompasses
the following components directed toward creating an
efficient market in health care goods and services which
will maximize overall social welfare.
Mandatory catastrophicinsurance. One fundamental goal of this solution is to provide universal health care
coverage. Universal coverage will not occur without a
government mandate.' Therefore, in order to achieve this
goal, mandatory catastrophic health care insurance is an
element of this solution. Mandatory catastrophic insurance is necessary to eliminate the market defect caused
by the free rider problem. Government intervention in this
area is both necessary and appropriate, reflecting a societal consensus in favor of universal coverage and individual responsibility. Although catastrophic insurance is
mandatory, the consumer will maintain the choice of how
this insurance fits into her total health care expenditures
beyond the mandatory coverage threshold. Specifically,
emergency medical care and hospitalization coverage will
be mandated. To reduce cost, this insurance policy will
have a high deductible which will be self-funded through
an MSA or additional insurance coverage. 9
All employed individuals will fund the purchase of this
insurance with pre-tax dollars. These dollars will be withheld from paychecks and paid directly to the health insurer of the employee's choice. Self-employed individu-
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als will have to provide proof of catastrophic insurance
with their routine tax disclosures. The federal government
will directly pay the cost of this insurance for employees
and entitlement recipients through a negative income tax?
Medical savingsaccount. In conjunction with required
catastrophic insurance, employed individuals will be required to establish and maintain a medical savings account. This MSA will tie the health care consumer directly
to the cost of health care, thus creating the incentive to
avoid excessive consumption. Actuarial data shows that
apart from catastrophic disease or injury, the average cost
of routine health maintenance is between two and three
thousand dollars annually. This amount also roughly corresponds with the average cost of participation in a health
maintenance organization. Therefore, individuals would
be required to establish and maintain MSAS large enough
to purchase a standard health maintenance plan and these
accounts would be available only to purchase qualified
health care or health care insurance.
Similar to the mandatory catastrophic insurance payment plan, the MSA would be funded with pre-tax dollars
through payroll deductions.
An individual would be allowed to make unlimited contributions to her MSA. At
death, an MSA fund could be
willed to family members'
MSAS, donated to medical
charities, or removed and
taxed. The federal govern-

Expanding the supply of health care services. Mandatory catastrophic insurance coverage and MSAS solve
the problems associated with
the uncontrolled demand for

The Preside n] s plan fails
to address ti defects
inherent in tthe healthcare m arket.

ment would establish MSAS
for all federal employees and all federal entitlement recipients.' Social workers would then counsel federal entitlement recipients to use their MSAS to the most personal
utility.?
In essence, the MSA is the best health plan available.
With an MSA program, the government requires people to
maintain the ability to purchase a fixed level of health
care; however, how a person does this is her choice. With
respect to achieving the goals of health care market reform, the MSA is the most effective alternative. The MSA
ties consumer demand for health care services directly to
the desire for the plan and the ability to pay the price.
With an MSA system, cost savings are achieved because the government's role as a direct provider and thirdparty payor of health care is eliminated and replaced with
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individual choice and responsibility. Furthermore, employers and state and local governments will have the flexibility to offer any type of health insurance they choose
in conjunction with, or to supplement, an employee's MSA.
Concomitantly, employees will have the choice to purchase the amount and type of health care that maximizes
personal welfare through their employer or from any other
source. Additionally, the MSA treats everyone similarly
situated equally."
A consumer's ability to purchase health care benefits
would be limited only by her income and lifestyle as manifested in risk classification. Thus, individuals will be encouraged to earn more, maximize their available health
care dollars, and live healthier lifestyles. Providers will
have to respond to consumer demands in terms of cost,
service, and information. Alliances and cooperatives providing both information and purchasing power will emerge
along traditional group lines to the extent such cooperation is beneficial.

health services. Currently, no

substitutes for physician-provided health care exist. The
following reforms will increase the supply of health
care providers. The American
Medical Association and affiliated groups control the
supply of health care providers through state licensing
boards and medical school admissions. This solution takes
a two-prong approach to expanding the supply of health
care providers, thereby reducing the overall cost of health
care. First, the federal government must promulgate regulations on licensing non-physician providers. Specifically,
restrictive state licensing regulations must be preempted;
thereafter consumers and insurers will be available to select non-physician providers for certain therapies. An
entirely new provider market will emerge, and as a result,
nurse-practitioners, midwives, and other specially trained
personnel will provide lower-cost primary care treatment.
Second, the overall number of physicians must be increased. This solution calls for physician numbers to be
increased by government regulation that forces an increase
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in total medical school enrollment. A larger pool of medical school graduates will increase the size of the physician population and allow provider groups to increase the
size and number of residency programs. Competition
among physicians for employment and patients will increase. Moreover, physicians will be forced to address
the cost and quality demands of both patients and provider groups. As in all businesses and professions, talented individuals will rise to the top of the market and
receive the benefits that their abilities command.
Reducing transactioncosts. Implementation of mandatory catastrophic insurance and MSAs eliminates the
government's role as a provider and third-party payor of
health care. Thus, federal regulation aimed at cost control will be redundant. Supply and demand will replace
government intervention and its accompanying transaction costs. Furthermore, this proposal calls for malpractice reform to reduce the overall transaction cost in the
health care market. Specifically, the damage categories
of pain and suffering and non-economic loss of consortium will be eliminated in ordinary negligence actions.98
As a result, transaction costs will be lowered, the deterrent effect of malpractice will be maintained, and the windfall component of many damage awards will be eliminated. In addition, in order to eliminate frivolous claims,
medical malpractice review boards will be established to
screen out clearly frivolous claims. 99 Finally, insurance
companies will be required to make mandatory comprehensive disclosures about the type of coverage policies
they provide. Such a requirement will allow consumers,
employers, and other alliances to compare the relative
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'For a definition of "free rider," see infra
note 51 and accompanying text.
2

Evidence that the American Medical Association and other physician groups
restrict the supply of physicians in the
United States is found in the fact that
international medical graduates make
up 21.4% of the total physician population in the United States. AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN
CHARACTERISTICS AND DIsTRIBUTION

INTHE U.S. (1990).
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value of different insurance policies. This reform will facilitate competition and reduce the current burden of analyzing benefit packages.

Funding
Funding for any health care reform plan must come
from one of three sources: employer mandates, borrowing, or taxes. Under the Clinton plan, employers would
bear the majority of health care costs for their employees.
Although providing a non-governmental funding mechanism, the economic effects of such mandates cannot be
ignored. As the cost of labor rises, the demand for labor
will decrease. Job loss and reduced overall production
will result."° Borrowing (a popular method of federal funding) merely passes the cost of current expenditures on to
future generations.'' Therefore, health care reform must
be funded out of current tax receipts. This will require
politicians and special interests groups to establish priorities.1 By paying for health care reform out of present
tax receipts, as contrasted to borrowing, the incentive to
act in an economically efficient manner is reinforced. 3

Conclusion
Those who do not learn from their mistakes are doomed
to repeat them. By totally ignoring free market economics, many proposed plans repeat the mistakes of the past.
Maximizing consumer welfare in the health care market
will only occur if the defects inherent in the market are
eliminated, and antitrust laws are prudently applied to
noncompetitive market participants.

0

T

These transaction costs are in the form of
insurance administrative costs, legal
costs related to regulatory compliance,
and costs associated with medical malpractice.
'Health care expenditures comprise 14%
of Gross National Product ("GNP").
Robert Pear, Health Care Costs Up
Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, atAl.
It is estimated that by the year 2000
health care costs will account for
16.4% of GNP. Sally T. Sonnenfield et
al., Projections of National Health

E

S

Care Expenditures Through 2030, 11
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv. 1, 1

(1991). Turning this portion of the
economy over to government control
is tantamount to accepting socialism as
our political norm.
'See infra Section I.D.
6In this paper, there is a decided attempt
to distinguish economically legitimate
health care reform from hidden political agendas. Politics as usual is a reality. However, this reality is neither
good governance nor intellectually
honest.
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Universal coverage mandates some type
of coverage limitation. This coverage
does not include unlimited access to all
available medical services without regard to lower cost health care alternatives and preventative care. Universal
health care implicitly contemplates
widespread public support. As a result,
it is limited by who and what the public is willing to support by a redistribution of wealth to finance universal
health care coverage. Therefore, like
publicly supported food stamp programs, housing, education, and criminal defense, publicly supported health
must reflect a two-tier system. Consistent with a capitalist economic system, people of different income levels
will receive different levels of health
care.
'As used in this paper, catastrophic health
insurance means coverage for inpatient
hospital care.
Our formulation and use of the MSA is
different from that used in those health
care reform proposals currently under
consideration.
"This minimum amount would correspond to the average cost of yearly
health maintenance in the United
States. Actuarial data suggests that between $2,000-3,000 per person would
be sufficient.
IMSA funds would be restricted to use on
qualified primary health care expenditures. Services such as purely elective
cosmetic surgery would not qualify.
Social workers would counsel federal
entitlement recipients on the best use
of their available health care resources,
most likely encouraging enrollment in
a health maintenance organization
("HMO").
HMOs are designed to provide certain
basic health care services to members
at a set fee, regardless of the services
actually utilized by a member. Under
this type of system, physicians work
as employees of the HMO and are paid
according to pre-arranged fee schedule. MOs maximize profits by limiting unnecessary services and encouraging efficiency by the selected physicians.
2
Negative income tax" refers to utilizing the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") as the transfer and compliance
agency for this health care proposal.
The IRS would transfer funds to the
insurance/MSA program of the
recipient's choice.
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"These Boards would be composed of
physicians, lawyers, businessmen, and
insurance executives.
"One need only read the National Health
Security Act for this point to be evident.
"The perfect competition model is based
on four major assumptions. First, homogeneity, i.e., all products are virtually identical in function and quality.
Second, the model assumes that all sellers and buyers are price seekers and
that no single producer is large enough
to effect market price or total market
output. Third, entry and exit barriers
do not exist in the model. Finally, the
competitive model assumes no transaction costs and assumes that all market participants are in possession of
perfect information regarding price,
output and quality levels.
"This is noteworthy because at that time
no claims of a health care crisis existed.
"At this point, health care was paid for on
a fee-for-service basis. For example,
prior to 1930, over 80 percent of
Americans covered their own medical
costs as the expenses were incurred.
"Individual accountability was an important virtue of the pre-1900 health care
paradigm. Americans were responsible
for their own lifestyle choices. Preventive measures were a viable alternative.
The medical cost of lifestyle choices
was born by the individual without economic externality.
"See generally STUART M. BUTLER &

EDMUND F. HAISLMAIER, A NATIONAL
HEALTH SYSTEM FOR AMERICA 4-5

(1989).
Because malpractice was not a concern
among physicians, patients did not receive unnecessary specialized tests nor
unneeded visits to specialists that are
often used as defensive protective measures by physicians today. For an example of a medical malpractice case
that is credited with promoting defensive medical treatment, see Harris v.
Robert C. Groth M.D., Inc., 663 P.2d
428 (1983) (glaucoma testing).
21Primary among the influential social,
political, and economic factors were
World Wars I and 1I and the Depression.
"In addition to the economic efficiencies,
medical developments contributed to
the increased utilization of hospitals.
For example, one major medical ad0

vance around this time was the development of antiseptics and sterilization
procedures. BUTLER & HAISLMAIER,
supra note 19, at 4. The resulting sudden increase in the number of hospitals was incredible: the number of hospitals grew from a mere 149 in 1873 to
almost 7,000 in 1923. Id. at 9. These
hospitals were located primarily in
population centers and were community or charitable in origin. Id.
21Id. at 4 (describing the "dramatic...
change in public attitudes toward hospitals"). "Americans no longer viewed
them as places housing the sick poor,
but as 'medical workshops'-the primary facilities for meeting the health
needs of the general population." Id.
at 5 (citing PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 145-79 (1982)).
4
2 The economic depression and the resulting unpaid patient medical bills were
other factors in hospital financing problems. LAWRENCE D. WEISS, No BENEFIT: CRISIS IN AMERICA'S HEALTH
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 11 (1992).
Health care is different from other goods
because we do not know when, or how
much health care we will need. As a
result, it is critical that we have excess
capacity in the health care market as a
whole. This demand for excess capacity is also a characteristic of other industries such as public utilities. When
we turn on the faucet we want water to
come out. This excess capacity is an
often overlooked component of overall health care costs. See generally
Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963).
6
See BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra note
19, at6.
271d.; see alsoWEISS, supra note 24, at 11.
2sBUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra note 19,
at 7.
"Id. at 8. The insurance commissions'
objectives were to "require these new
plans to maintain reserve funds - that
is, to set aside a portion of their premium revenues to cover unexpectedly
large claims." Id. This would have reduced profits.
'OId. at 8-9; see also WEISS, supra note
24, at 11.
31BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supranote 19, at 9.
The special enabling legislation
sought by the AHA conferred the
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following advantages and privileges on the proposed hospital service corporations: exemption
from the general insurance laws
of the state; status as a charitable
and benevolent organization; exemption from the obligation of
maintaining the reserves required
of commercial insurers; and tax
exemption.
WEISS, supra note 24, at 11 (citations
omitted).
32
By 1945, Blue Cross plans existed in 35
states and controlled around sixty percent of the hospital insurance market.
See WEISS, supra note 24, at 12-13.
Encouraged by the success of the Blue
Cross hospital plans, physicians'
groups established similar "Blue
Shield" plans to cover other medical
expenses. Id. at 13.
33
Id. at 11. In exchange for the preferential exemptions from state regulation,
the Blues were required to provide coverage to all applicants at the same rates.
See BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra

note 19, at 9. This, in effect, subsidized
medical care and insulated the consumer from the actual costs.
Id. Cartel pricing has long been recognized as a per se violation of the antitrust laws. See United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1897).
35
BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra note 19,
at9.
36Id.
37

Id. Health insurance was an effective
means of attracting employees while
ostensibly holding wages constant. Id.
The availability of health care coverage became an important non-cash salary component and served as a hidden
wage supplement. Id.
3
"Id. at 10; see also WEISS, supra note 24,
at 14.
9
BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra note 19,
at 10. This ruling increased the number of plans and the scope of coverage
provided. Id.
101d. Economists characterize this situation
as "moral hazard." HAL R. VARIAN,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 239
(1978). Moral hazard occurs when
somebody else pays for a good or service. Id. In health insurance, the moral
hazard problem promotes the excessive
consumption of health services. The
moral hazard problem is further exac-
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erbated by government decision making. Government decision making often results in the over-consumption of
a public good. See generally Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
"Additionally, employer-provided health
insurance is "non-portable" and thus
restricts movement in the labor market.
42
See BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra note
19, at 15. "Even the American Medical Association and other staunch defenders of private health care agreed
that the government should in some
way help meet the health care needs of
the elderly and the poor." Id.
43
Medicaid is a social welfare program to
fund health care services for the poor,
disabled, and other needy individuals.
See BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra

note 19, at 16. It is funded with both
federal and state government dollars
and is operated by state governments.
Id.
"Medicare provided funding for health
care services for the elderly. BUTLER
& HAISLMAIER, supra note 19, at 16.
One portion of the program provided
general hospital insurance and was
available to all elderly persons, regardless of income. The second portion of
the program provided additional coverage for physician services and was
funded through federal subsidies and
recipient premiums. Id.
4
'BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra note 19,
at 16.
46Id.
47

For a discussion of the market disincentives under this reimbursement financing system, see supra notes 25-32 and
accompanying text.
"See BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra note
19, at 16. "[B]eneficiaries had virtually
no incentive to question costs and every incentive to demand more services." Id. "Even the few restraints that
still remained in the private sector were
completely absent in these new government programs." Id. at 17.
49For example, government expenditures
on Medicare and Medicaid were $8.94
billion in 1970. WEISS, supra note 24,
at 19. This expenditures reached
$46.12 billion in 1980, and $102.56
billion in 1987. Id.
"The current figure utilized by the Clinton
Administration is 37 million uninsured

persons. See Greg Steinmetz, Shaky
Statistic: Number of Uninsured Stirs
Much Confusion in Health-Care Debate,WALL ST. J., June 9, 1993, at Al.
5
Free riders are health care recipients who
do not purchase health care insurance
or pay for the health care services they
receive. Consequently, many of these
individuals do not purchase low cost
.preventative health care and only enter the health care market as the result
of a catastrophic disease or injury.
Thus, the free rider elects to maximize
current consumption by not purchasing the health insurance or preventative care that he can afford. As a result
the free rider postpones health care
expenditures until forced to use
unaffordable high cost emergency care.
Further, anyone who does not pay the
fair market value for health insurance,
or health care received, is a free rider
to a certain degree. Thus, through price
controls on Medicare, the government
is a free rider.
52Federal legislation and medical ethical
standards prohibit physicians and hospitals from turning away patients in
need of care. For example, in 1985
Congress passed the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1985 ("COBRA"). Pub. L. No. 99-272
(1986). Certain provisions of COBRA,
known as the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act
("EMTALA") prohibit "patient dumping." Under these provisions, a hospital that receives Medicare funding can
not turn away a patient with an emergency condition. Rather, the hospital
must provide tests and examinations to
determine if an emergency condition
exists.
3
This includes self-insured individuals.
'See Wilk v. AMA, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir.
1983) (holding that AMA regulations
that prevented physicians from professionally dealing with chiropractors
were a Sherman Act §1 violation).
Primary health care services means diagnostic and specialty treatment procedures. This is in contrast to routine
physician-prescribed therapy, which is
currently provided by non-physicians.
' The National Planning and Resources
Development Act was enacted in 1974,
to ensure that demand existed before
health care facilities were built or expanded. See Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88
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Stat. 225 (1975), later codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300(k-m) (repealed).
7
1 See CHAYET & SONNENREICH, P.C.,
CERTIFICATE OF NEED: AN EXPANDING

REGULATORY CONCEPT (1978).
" See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman,
Health Care Cost Containment and
Medical Technology: A Critique of
Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
778, 843 (1986). Competitive market
forces and anti-fraud statutes should
have preempted the need for such legislation. See id. However, such forces
were never allowed to act. See id.
"The program was repealed by Pub. L.
No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3799 (1986). See
also James B. Simpson, Full Circle:
The Return of CertificateofNeed Regulation of Health Facilitiesto State Control, 19 IND. L. REV. 1025 (1986).
60BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra note 19,
at 23. In 1973, there were 93 state mandated benefit laws; by 1988, there were
726 such laws. Id.
61
id.
62
See Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974). ERISA was designed to "protect
the interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries." Id.
at 833. The law was primarily intended
to protect employees from abuses in
employer sponsored pension plans.
63

BUTLER & HAISLMAIER, supra note 19,

tion exemption was limited. Cantor v.
Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976)
(holding that exempted conduct must
be mandated by the state). In 1979,
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal
Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) clarified the McCarron-Ferguson insurance
immunity and held that health care providers, merely being reimbursed by an
insurance company, were not engaged
in the "business of insurance."
67457 U.S. 332 (1982). In holding that the
establishment of minimum prices was
a per se violation of the Sherman Act,
the MaricopaCourt reasoned that "the
claim that the price restraint will make
it easier for customers to pay does not
distinguish the medical profession
from any other provider of goods or
services." Id. at 349.
'See id.
'See, e.g., United States v. North Dakota
Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.
N.D. 1986); Ohio v. Greater Cleveland
Hosp. Ass'n, 1983-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,685 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (consent decree); United States v. Montana
Nursing Home Ass'n, 1982-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 64, 852 (D. Mont. 1982)
(consent decree); United States v.
South Carolina Healthcare Ass'n, Inc.,
1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63, 616 (D.
S.C. 1980) (consent decree).
70101 F.T.C. 191 (1983).

7
See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Denat 22.
tists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Barry v. St.
"Id. at 24. Pps was an effort to curtail costs
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 438 U.S.
531 (1978).
under Medicare's open-ended reimbursement system. Id. Prior to the en- "See, e.g., In the Matter of Physicians of
actment of PPS hospitals and physicians
Meadville, 109 F.T.C. 61 (1982) (group
were induced to charge as much as they
boycott); Patrick v. Burgett, 496 U.S.
could for patient treatment. Id. at 25.
94 (1988) (peer review).
'Id. at 25. For example, while PPS has been
11981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64, 151 (M.D.
effective in reducing the growth of
Fla. 1981) (consent decree); see also
hospital reimbursements, Medicare
Eugene M. Addison, M.D., 111 F.T.C.
physician reimbursements (which are
339 (1988) (consent order); Forbes
not cost controlled) have skyrocketed.
Health Sys. Medical Staff, 94 FT.C.
Id.
1042 (1979) (consent order).
For example, in Goldfarb v. Virginia 14For other group boycott staff privileges
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the
cases, see Summit Health, Ltd. v.
Supreme Court rejected the "learned
Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991); Bhan v.
profession" antitrust exemption. A year
NNE Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404
later, the Court utilized a health indus(9th Cir. 1991) (summary judgment for
try case to broadly interpret the jurisdefendant hospital because of insuffidictional requirement of an effect on
cient market share to substantiate nurse
interstate commerce. See Hospital
anesthetist's challenge of hospital's
Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosexclusive use of anesthesiologist).
pital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976); accord
The
federal government played a major
Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S.
role in the establishment of HMOs. In
322 (1991). Additionally, the state ac-
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1973, Congress enacted the Health
Maintenance Organization Act in order to "provide assistance and encouragement for the establishment and expansion of health maintenance organizations" as alternatives to traditional
insurance. Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat.
914, 914 (1973).
75
See, e.g., Health Care Mgmt. Corp., 107
F.T.C. 285 (1985) (consent order involving podiatrists); Medical Staff of
Mem. Medical Ctr., 110 F.T.C. 541
(1988) (consent order involving nurse
midwives). In general, however, these
provider efforts to reduce non-physician substitutes have been successful.
Some types of physician agreements that
appear to be group boycotts actually
serve legitimate economic and patient
care purposes. For example, in
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), the Supreme
Court upheld an exclusive contract
between a hospital and a group of anesthesiologists, finding an insufficient
market share to declare the practice a
per se tying arrangement. The effect of
this case, however, was to limit the
hospital staff privileges of other doctors and to require that any hospital
patients utilized those doctors. See
also, Beard v. Park View Hosp., 912
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1990); White v.
Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820
F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1987).
76
Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d
1381 (7th Cir. 1986) cert. denied 481
U.S. 1038 (1987) (divestiture of hospitals acquired in the Chattanooga,
Tennessee area ordered); In the Matter
of Amer. Medical Int., Inc., 107 F.T.C.
310 (1984) (divestiture of hospital in
San Luis Obispo, California ordered).
77
See generallyPHILIP A. PROGER, AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF HEALTH CARE

PROVIDER JOINT VENTURES (1992). In
evaluating the antitrust implications of
a health care joint venture, the inquiry
will focus on the resulting market
share. Id. at 6. A court will examine:
"(1) the degree of concentration in the
relevant market... ; (2) the degree to
which there are barriers to entry into
the relevant market; and (3) the number of actual and perceived potential
entrants into that market." Id. at 6-7.
A venture's competitive effects will be
balanced against any uncompetitive
effects. Id. at 9.
7
See Weiss, supra note 24, at 72.
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See McCarron-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1011-15 (1988). As interpreted by
the Supreme Court, this immunity applies so long as the insurance entity is
regulated by state law and the challenged conduct does not involve "boycott, coercion, or intimidation." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, U.S. -_, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993).
The theory of the second best posits that
if a monopoly on one side (supply or
demand) is inevitable, then the best
way to counter a negative market effect from the monopoly is to allow a
monopoly on the opposite side of the
market to develop.
For example, in U.S. HealthCare, Inc. v.
U.S. HealthSource, Inc., a court upheld
a contract between an HMO and its
physicians which prohibited the physicians from providing services to any
other HMO. 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69, 697 (D.N.H. 1992). Under rule of
reason analysis, the court found a large
relevant market, the general health care
financing market. Id. at 67, 180. Additionally, the court acknowledged the
economic efficiencies achieved by
such a contract. Id. Similarly, a court
has upheld an HMO's exclusive contract with certain specialists, finding
that no conspiracy existed and that
there was not a significant restraint of
trade. Capital Imaging Assocs. v.
Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 791
F. Supp. 956 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
In Austin v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Alabama, 903 F.2d, 1385
(1lth Cir. 1990), hospital patients not
insured by the Blues brought suit to
challenge the lower rates charged to
Blue Cross members. Under the
plaintiff's theory, the hospitals were
subsidizing the lower rates by charging higher rates to other patients, i.e.,
"cost shifting." The court disagreed,
finding no antitrust injury because the
Blue Cross/hospital agreements were
competitive:
[T]he agreements between Blue
Cross and the hospitals... actually promote competition within
the relevant health care market by
allowing Blue Cross to charge
lower rates to its subscribers resulting from a reduction in the
cost of health care services which
it purchases from hospitals. To the
extent competitors seek to compete successfully with Blue Cross,
they will be required to lower
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their rates or improve the benefits
offered to subscribers.
Id. at 1391. See also Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F2d
80 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1093 (1973) ("The antitrust laws
... protect competition, not competitors; and stiff competition is encouraged, not condemned.").
Only one recent case actually condemns insurer attempts at exclusive
contracts. In Reazin v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 899 F.2d
951 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 110
S.Ct. 3241 (1990), the Tenth Circuit
held that Blue Cross committed an antitrust violation by threatening to end
relations with a hospital that would not
enter into an exclusive contract.
82 Specifically, the alliances would cover
all employees of companies with fewer
than 5,000 employees, all federal employees, and all other individuals except Medicare recipients. Employers
with over 5,000 employees would be
permitted to establish their own alliances.
83One need only look to Medicare and
Medicaid to see that the federal government has already demonstrated its
inability to efficiently operate such a
system.
'Clinton uses the doublespeak term "global budgeting" to refer to rationing.
85
See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284 (1985).
Strict guidelines have been proposed to
regulate these networks and their operations. As Part I.D. of this paper demonstrates, government regulation of the
health care market has been ineffective
at best and, at worst, resulted in partial
market failure.
"Or, in this situation, allowing competitive forces to drive the market instead
of the government.
"Government lifestyle mandates could
occur by virtue of banning tobacco and
alcohol as well as making high risk
recreational behavior illegal.
9See generally THOMAS J. PHILIPSON &
RICHARD

A.

POSNER,

PRIVATE

CHOICES, PUBLIC HEALTH (1993).
'"See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). In this case,
the Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens,
rejected an NCAA revenue sharing

plan also designed to diversify televised collegiate football, on the
grounds that plaintiffs were denied the
ability to pursue their own individual
interests in the negotiation of television
rights.
The only solution to high cost specialists consistent with Clinton's basic formulation of universal coverage is to
simply exclude specialist services from
government mandated health coverage.
Under a two-tiered system, this solution would permit those who want to
use specialists to obtain pay for insurance which covers their services. Those
who could not afford high cost specialists could appeal to charity, get a job,
or do without.
"Some individuals will choose not to purchase health insurance and instead
spend their economic resources on
other goods.
"The deductible must be set at a level to
dissuade the unnecessary use of emergency medical care. Although mandates are unfavored, they are clearly
preferable to wholesale government
takeover.
9'This system reflects that collecting
money through the Internal Revenue
Service is one thing federal and state
governments appear to do in a reasonably efficient manner. Government
payment will be phased out over income levels in order to allow people
to seek employment without the current fear of losing health insurance benefits.
95
Members of military and foreign service
and their dependents are the only exception to this plan. Health care capacity in the military is a component of
military readiness. Furthermore, military personnel are often stationed in
areas where quality health care is not
available. Therefore, in order to serve
the health care needs of military personnel and maintain well trained military physicians the current military
health system would be maintained.
Retired military personnel would be
treated the same as any other federal
entitlement recipient with an exception
for combat-injured veterans.
'Entitlement recipients would most likely
use their funds to participate in the
HMO of their choice. This solution
reflects the notion that people will not
take charge of their lives unless given
a reason. It rejects the paternalistic
notion that individuals receiving pub-
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lic assistance cannot make choices with
respect to money and lifestyle.
9 Artificial risk lines will not be drawn on
the basis of geography as with a regional alliance. Furthermore, an employee will not be placed in a risk pool
on the basis of the pool of other employees who work at the same corporation. People who live in areas with
high health care costs will not be able
to externalize that cost of living over
the rest of the population. This concept
is no different than New Yorkers paying more for car insurance than people
who live in Iowa. Furthermore, the

janitor at the federal building does not
receive better health care than the janitor across the street working for a private employer, and the self-employed
purchase health care with the same
pre-tax dollars as all other employees.
"Proven economic loss of consortium
damages will be maintained. Furthermore, all existing damages will be
available in cases involving gross negligence.
'These boards will review claims and issue approvals to proceed with cases in
the same manner as other state regulatory bodies.

E

__

-

"0Furthermore, employer mandates are an

artificial barrier to market entry and
could be a factor in market concentration.
101Borrowing externalizes the cost of care
to future individuals who have no say
in the current formulation of policy.
02Society in general must determine
whether angora wool price supports are
more important than universal health
care coverage.
03This economic concept is the same as
tying consumer health care use and
payment together.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Free safety reviews
Many small businesses dread the prospect of a
workplace safety inspection. The U.S. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) randomly
performs OSHA enforcement audits. Small companies
may find it difficult and costly to stay abreast of
complex safety regulations.
The OSHA Consultation Service, an independent
branch of OSHA, sponsors a program designed to help
small businesses with 250 or fewer employees. The
service offers free workplace safety reviews. If any
violations are discovered, the company is allowed to
correct the infractions within an agreed-upon time. In
addition to avoiding penalties, firms that excel under
the program are exempt from random inspections.
More than 397,000 visits have been made since the
program began in 1975. Presently, the average wait for
a visit is one to two months according to Joe Collier,
the program's director. For more information, small
businesses should contact their state's labor department.

Smokers feel older
Smoking can make elderly women feel older,
according to a recent study. Researchers have found
smoking can affect a woman's muscle strength, agility,
and balance. The study, published in the Journalof the
American Medical Association, measured how women
over 65 performed basic tasks in 12 categories such as
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gripping an object, walking, rising from a chair, and
climbing stairs.
Smokers performed more poorly than non-smokers
in 11 of the 12 categories, according to Dr. Heidi
Nelson, chief author of the report and an assistant
professor of internal medicine at Oregon Health
Sciences University's School of Medicine.
The results for the smokers were similar to what
would have been expected for women years older. "For
an older woman, smoking may have the same effect as
adding five years to a person's age," Nelson said. "The
study adds to the long list of reasons why people should
not be smoking."

New Info Catalog
The Consumer Information Center offers a complimentary catalog listing free and low-cost federal
publications to interested consumers. The Consumer
Information Catalog is published quarterly and describes more than 200 federal consumer publications
available to the public.
Titles include: "Buying a Used Car," "How to File a
Claim for your Benefits," and "Consumer Handbook to
Credit Protection Laws." Many of the publications are
free. Consumers may order up to 25 different free
booklets at one time. The majority of booklets for sale
cost 50 cents.
To obtain a copy of the Consumer Information
Catalog, write to: S. James, Consumer Information
Center-4A, Dept. R,, Pueblo, CO 81009.
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